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The Changing Relationship between the Justice and Development 
Party and the Kurds in Turkey 
Question 
Why did Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) introduce the September 
2013 reforms package1?  
Importance of Question 
In September of 2013 Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) announced 
a package of reforms, many of which were concerned with Turkey’s Kurdish population 
by giving them more freedoms and the chance to compete politically on the national 
stage. The purpose of this paper is to determine what the AKP’s motivations were for 
doing so.  It is valuable to know what the reasons behind the AKP’s decision were for 
three reasons. First, it may allow researchers to more easily predict what conditions 
may lead to similar reforms in the future, within Turkey specifically. Second, it provides 
an example of how to improve relations between a government and ethnic minority that 
have a long history of conflict. This example may help to solve similar issues in other 
countries. Third, it may clarify the goals the AKP had in mind when implementing the 
reforms, thereby giving insight into the desired effects of the reforms.  
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 The package included a number of reforms which gave more cultural and linguistic freedom to Kurds among 
other things. The reforms are explained in more detail in the background portion of the thesis 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the reasons behind the introduction of the September 2013 
package reforms by the AKP. Research from two prior periods of reform has been 
compiled and analyzed to determine possible reasons for the introduction of these 
reforms.  The first period encompasses  2002-2003 and the other 2009-10. It then 
examines three possible reasons for the 2013 reforms, two supported by the literature 
and one which is not, to determine the reasons behind the AKP’s decision to introduce 
the aforementioned reform package. 
Background 
Because this paper focuses only on the reforms enacted after the AKP came to 
power in 2002, the background section will cover only the period between the AKP’s 
rise to power and the present2. This section will give the reader a background on three 
things: an overview of the AKP party, its relations with the European Union and an 
overview of each of the three periods of reform that will be examined.   
The AKP 
 The story of the reforms that are being examined in this paper is also the story of 
the AKP. The AKP had a clear majority in parliament during every period of reform and 
it was their support that made these reforms possible.   
The AKP’s Rise to Power 
 The AKP was formed less than a year before the 2002 elections, bringing 
together a number of conservatives under the leadership of the popular former mayor of 
                                               
2
 March 2014 
3 
Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP came to power in 2002 running on a platform 
of Islamic values3, liberal economics and a closer association with Europe (Hurriyet, 
2007). They were able to obtain an unprecedented majority in parliament even though 
they obtained only 35% of the popular vote and every single party that had been in 
parliament in the previous session was expelled because they did not pass the 10% 
election threshold. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was the only party in 
opposition at that point, but the AKP had a large enough majority that it did not need to 
work with the CHP (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2002).  
The Evolution of the AKP’s Constituency 
As previously stated, the AKP was originally devoted to three main principles: 
conservative or Islamic values, liberal economics, and a closer association with Europe. 
This allowed the AKP to create a very broad coalition throughout society (Kemal, 2013), 
especially because of the broad level of support at the time for European integration 
(The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013). This support continued, not in 
the least because of Turkey’s staggering economic growth (World Economic Forum, 
2006) under Erdogan. Unfortunately once the credible commitment4 from the European 
Union disappeared, the coalition began to splinter as Erdogan and the AKP began to 
take a more conservative and nationalistic approach to governance (Kemal, 2013). This 
process has continued since and culminated with the recent protests across Turkey 
                                               
3 AKP officials do not call their values Islamic, instead they assign them the term conservative democratic values 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2010). For the purposes of this paper though they will be called Islamic or conservative 
values interchangeably. 
4
 This will be defined later in the Literature Review portion of this thesis.  
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against Erdogan and the laws restricting internet use passed in reaction to the protests 
(New York Times Editorial Board, 2014).  
The AKP has traditionally had a large following amongst both Kurds and 
followers of the expatriate leader of the Hizmet movement, Fetullah Gulen. But the AKP 
has gradually been losing support amongst the Kurds in the last decade to Kurdish 
regional parties and independent candidates who were generally Kurds (Cengiz & 
Hoffmann, 2013) (Ozkirimli, 2013). The AKP has also lost the support of the Hizmet 
movement due to an open conflict between Fetullah Gulen and Erdogan5 which has 
been at the forefront of Turkish domestic politics in recent months (Financial Times, 
2014).  
Relations with the European Union 
The AKP entered office promising to enact a number of reforms and bring Turkey 
and Europe even closer together (Kemal, 2013). They were able to successfully 
introduce reforms in 2002 (explained in background section) which allowed them to 
begin accession negotiations with the European Union in 2005, opening a number of 
chapters of reform6 (European Commission). Unfortunately, problems with the island of 
Cyprus7 halted negotiations in 2006. Turkey refused to normalize relations with Nicosia 
and in turn the European Commission froze eight chapters (Castle, 2006). Cyprus and 
                                               
5 This conflict is explained further in the data analysis portion of this thesis.  
6 There are 35 areas in which countries hoping to obtain membership must comply with European rules in order to 
be eligible for membership. These areas are generally referred to as chapters (European Commission). 
7 Turkey recognizes the northern portion of Cyprus as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but this state is not 
recognized by any other country and the state of Cyprus considers it to be under occupation.  
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France blocked additional chapters in 2009 (Famagusta Gazzete, 2013) and no 
additional chapters were opened until November of 2013 when the Chapter on Regional 
Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments was opened (The Council of the 
European Union, 2013) after France unblocked it. 
Reforms implemented under AKP rule 
 Three periods of reform have occurred since the AKP’s rise to power that have 
specifically affected the Kurds. The first began in 2002 and ended in 2003 and focused 
on removing abusive terrorism laws and promoting linguistic rights. The second period 
encompassed 2009-2010 and was named the “Kurdish Opening”. This period of reform 
focused on cultural and linguistic rights as well as the reform of anti-terror laws. The 
most recent period of reform was in September 2013 and it focused on electoral reforms 
and linguistic rights.  
2002-2003 Reforms 
  In 2002 the Turkish government began to enact a series of reforms in order to 
conform to the Copenhagen political criteria8.  These reforms included lifting emergency 
rule in all provinces, repealing laws dealing with terrorist propaganda, the abolition of 
state security courts and laws that allowed public television broadcasts in Kurdish. 
These reforms also removed a tool which the Turkish government had often used to jail 
Kurds who may have had no association with terrorist activities. Finally, it allowed Kurds 
to see televisions shows in their own language and television stations to air such shows 
without fear of prosecution. This series of reforms was successful and by the end  
                                               
8 A set of criteria that states must meet in order to be considered for full membership in the European Union 
(European Commission). 
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Turkey was able to begin accession negotiations with the European Union  (Cengiz & 
Hoffmann, 2013).  
 2009-2010 Reforms: The Kurdish Opening 
In 2009 the Turkish government announced an initiative to grant greater rights to 
the Kurdish minority and reconcile with the PKK. The Turkish government began by 
implementing laws to decrease the penalties given to children who throw rocks at 
security service members as a good-will measure and allowing the Kurdish language to 
be taught at the university level (Today's Zaman, 2010) (Istanbul Daily News, 2010). 
Turkey’s Interior Minister Besir Atalay also introduced a six step democratization plan 
including:  “an independent human-rights institution, A commission to combat 
discrimination, parliamentary ratification of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and a 
national preventative mechanism, an independent body tasked with receiving and 
investigating accusations of torture or mistreatment by the security forces,  renaming of 
residential areas in line with demands from locals, political parties will be free to 
communicate in languages other than Turkish” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2009).  
 Unfortunately the bulk of these reforms were never implemented because of the 
failure of the AKP’s reconciliation plan with the PKK. The plan involved PKK fighters 
returning to Turkey under an amnesty, which the AKP hoped would foster peace. 
Instead the PKK returned acting as victors to an exuberant Kurdish populace and the 
outraged Turks rose against these reforms because, in their minds, terrorists were 
being allowed to return to Turkey as heroes. There was such a large backlash that the 
AKP was forced to backpedal and was not able to implement many of the reforms it 
originally hoped to (Captagay, "Kurdish Opening" Closed Shut, 2009).  
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  September 2013 Reforms 
 In September 2013 the AKP announced a package of reforms affecting the 
Kurds. This package included reforms that allowed expanded use of the Turkish 
language including allowing cities to be called by their Kurdish names, allowing private 
schools to teach Turkish and making it legal to use letters of the alphabet associated 
with Kurdish. The AKP also intended to establish an anti-discrimination commission to 
investigate hate crimes and abolish the use of a nationalist oath in public schools. In 
addition, an order to remove the ban on the wearing of headscarves in certain situations 
was included. Finally, the package included electoral reforms that lowered the electoral 
threshold from 10%9 and the threshold for public financing of campaigns from 7% to 
3%, both reforms that will make it easier for Kurdish and regional parties to succeed on 
the national stage (BBC, 2013).  
Literature Review 
        For the purposes of this paper, only reforms that occurred during the AKP’s time in 
power will be examined (Post 2002). There have been two periods of reform that have 
involved the Kurds during the AKP’s time in power that are covered by the literature, 
one in 2002-2003 and the other in 2009. Unfortunately because there is a dearth of 
literature dealing with the September 2013 reforms, they are not included in the 
literature review but will be addressed in the Data Analysis section. The literature seems 
to agree that there was one determining factor which caused each period of reform. In 
the case of the 2002-2003 reforms, there is clear evidence showing that a credible 
commitment from the European Union (EU) to Turkish integration spurred the AKP into 
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 Where it will be lowered to is not yet clear (BBC, 2013) 
8 
action. There is also a consensus that the 2009 reforms were mainly the result of 
domestic political factors.  
Credible Commitment 
There was a wide range of scholarship which pegged responsibility for the first 
period of reforms on a credible commitment by the EU to Turkey and Turkey’s 
subsequent desire to meet the acquis10 requirements and eventually join the Union. 
Credible commitment can be defined as a commitment on the part of the EU apparatus 
and its two most influential member states, France and Germany, to the accession into 
the Union of Turkey11. This is a credible commitment because Turkey knows that it will 
be supported by the two most powerful members of the Union who other members will 
look to when they vote and shows that the EU apparatus is also committed to working 
with Turkey to integrate it.  
Evidence that Credible Commitment Caused Change 
The contention that these reforms were made because of credible commitment is 
proven by data sets compiled by Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013) demonstrating a direct 
correlation between the European Union’s commitment to Turkey’s membership and 
reforms. Their research clearly shows a connection between a credible commitment 
from the European Union to Turkey’s accession12 and the rate of reforms by 
demonstrating that once Turkey was recognized as a candidate in 1999 the pace of 
reforms within Turkey increased rapidly (Cengiz and Hoffman 421). 
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 “The body of law accumulated by the European Union” which a state is required to implement in order 
to be considered for full membership in the European Union (Collins Dictionary). 
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 France and Germany are widely recognized as the two most influential members of the union and the drivers 
behind integration (Euractiv, 2014) 
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       Cengiz and Hoffman (2013) also point out that after the accession of Cyprus, 
reforms halted because the credible commitment disappeared after Cyrpus began 
blocking Turkey’s accession to the Union. This went on until 2009 when reforms were 
restarted in the form of the AKP’s ‘Kurdish Opening’13, but according to the authors 
these reforms were due to domestic political factors rather than any outside influence14. 
The authors also downplay some of the effects of internal actors, demonstrating the way 
in which fragile coalition governments from 1998-2002 were able to pass reforms. 
These coalition governments did so in spite of large domestic opposition because they 
had a credible commitment from the European Union. Once that commitment 
disappeared though, a political party with a strong electoral mandate to rule backed 
away from reforms after initially failing at them15. They demonstrate the penchant for the 
civilian government to pass only those specific reforms which would increase its own 
power at the expense of other domestic players after there was no longer a credible 
commitment from the EU. 
These views are also echoed by Soner Captagay who wrote in a 2013 Op-ed 
that,  
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As the first step of this initiative, 34 PKK members were officially allowed to enter Turkey from their 
Iraqi bases in November 2009. Kurdish nationalists celebrated this gesture as a victory 
against the Turkish state, thereby attracting the fury of Turkish nationalists. As a result, 
the government renamed the initiative ‘Democratic Opening’ and later ‘National Unity 
Plan’ and soon after abandoned it completely without any further actions.  (Cengiz and Hoffman 424) 
14
 The AKP lost many votes in the region to a Kurdish party due to the slow pace of reform (DTP) and wanted to 
regain them. 
15
 The case referred to here is the ‘Kurdish Opening’. This attempt to regain the votes of Turkish citizens in the 
Southeast failed spectacularly as the Kurds claimed it as a victory against the Turkish state provoking a backlash 
from ethnic Turkish citizens. 
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When Europe shows a serious commitment to Turkey, it responds by liberalizing…. Turkey will 
only reform itself when it believes the prospect of European Union accession is real. This explains 
why Mr. Erdogan’s government cooled toward the idea of membership around 2005 and began to 
pursue blatantly illiberal policies at home, like intimidating and imprisoning journalists. (Captagay, 
2013) 
Captagay shows that Turkey will liberalize when there is a serious commitment from the 
EU and his example of Mr. Erdogan in 2005 shows that when that commitment 
disappears so does the drive for reform.  
 
Kisacik (2014) points to a number of harmonization measures adopted by Turkey 
after beginning accession procedures, as evidence of the effect that a credible 
commitment can have. These reforms include allowing broadcasts in languages other 
than Turkish, and the use of those languages in other public spheres as well. Kisacik 
(2014) believes that the changes in minority rights within Turkey have been largely due 
to the influence of the European Union, and despite setbacks in 2005-2008, the reforms 
have succeeded in mobilizing Kurdish civil society16 and provided a political context for 
minority-majority relations in Turkey. 
These authors demonstrate that Turkey tends to implement reforms that move 
her closer in line with European rules when a credible commitment is available from the 
European Union and that when that commitment disappears, the pace of reforms slows 
dramatically. This trend can also be seen in a number of other states that have joined 
the European Union since the fall of the Iron Curtain which were also required to reform 
in return for membership in the Union and have now become members. The effect of a 
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 An op-ed from a Kurdish MP in the New York Times in 2011 shows that a Kurdish civil society has been allowed 
to develop and is speaking out, publishing their views and electing 36 Kurdish MP’s to the Turkish parliament. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/opinion/18tuncel.html?_r=0 Accessed: 1/05/2014 
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European commitment on reforms has also been recognized both by members of the 
European Parliament (European Parliament External Relations, 2014) and the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2012) in addition to the authors 
mentioned above.   
Globalization/Europeanization and the European Union 
 The literature endeavors to answer the question of whether or not these reforms 
were due solely or primarily to a credible commitment to the European Union. Kisacik 
(2013) has written about this subject and believes that though the European Union may 
have a large effect, a portion of the credit can be assigned to European organizations 
other than the EU. Kisacik (2013) draws a clear distinction between Europeanization 
and the effects of the EU on reforms. He defines Europeanization as the influence 
exerted by any number of European organizations17. His argument is that much of the 
progress made by these organizations is incorrectly attributed to the EU and that some 
of the credit for this success should be given to other intergovernmental organizations 
instead. Zeydanlioglu (2014) also has a similar view but approaches it from a different 
perspective. His writings focus on linguistic reforms specifically within Turkey, and while 
he does credit the European Union with playing a part in the periods of reform seen in 
Turkey, he says we should hesitate to award it a preeminent role. He believes that a 
number of changes, both within and without Turkey, made the pressure for reforms so 
large that the Turkish government was forced to act. In his view globalization and 
increased mobilization were also factors that played into forcing the government’s hand.  
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 The Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for example. This view is also 
supported by Cengiz and Hoffman.  
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European Union’s Approach to Reforms 
The view of Kisacik (2014) and Ozkirimli (2013) is that the European Union’s 
approach to reforms is the reason for its success in encouraging them. The EU 
approaches this issue from the stance of individual or human rights rather than those of 
a minority18  or race and clearly states that it wants freedoms for the Kurds within 
Turkey, but does not support independence. This assuages some of the fears of many 
Turks and allows reforms to proceed under the framework of individual rights19.  
Ozkirimli (2013) shows how controversial this can be saying 
It needs to be stressed, at the risk of reiteration, that any attempt at the public recognition of 
Kurdish identity should adopt the language of human rights and promote universal values, such 
as democracy, justice and equality, not the inherent value of Kurdish culture or cultural diversity in 
general 
Ozkirimli (2013) recognizes that any attempt to promote Kurdish culture may be seen as 
an attack on the state of Turkey by Turkish nationalists (Ozkirimli, 2013, p. 5) and that 
individual human rights should be promoted above all in order to avoid conflict and 
better facilitate dialogue. 
Another effective method of framing reforms, suggested by Noel and Bahceli 
(2010), is that presenting them as steps on the road to further democratization and 
eventual EU membership makes them easier to pass. The following passage from their 
article is relevant, 
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 Kisacik (2014) mentions that using the term minority for Turkey’s Kurdish population is distasteful for both 
sides. The leaders of the Turkish republic do not want to use this term since too many it would mean that the 
Kurds deserved more autonomy or even independence, while many Kurds consider themselves to be “co-
founders” of   the republic and believe that calling themselves a minority would be degrading. 
19
 The Commission recommended in 1998 the recognition of certain forms of cultural identity and greater 
tolerance of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism (European 
Commission, 1998, p. 20)  
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In easing restrictions on the Kurds, the AKP government was on safer ground when it was able to 
portray its actions as advancing Turkey’s human rights agenda, which is widely acknowledge[d] 
to be a policy imperative if EU membership requirements are to be met, and the AKP’s 
democratic agenda as proclaimed in its programme, which (in principle) enjoys widespread 
support (Bahceli & Noel, 2010, p. 107).  
Noel and Bahceli (2010) believe that this structure was more palatable for Turkish 
leaders and allowed reforms to continue apace because it allows them to say they are 
advancing democratization and general rights rather than rights for the Kurds 
specifically. The authors add that two other factors were at play in the first period of 
AKP reforms: a restrained military and a ceasefire from the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK). According to the authors, both of these factors were relevant to the success in 
passing the reforms; however they do not make clear to what degree each is 
responsible.   
Credible Commitment and Public Opinion 
There is also a connection between governmental action and popular support for 
EU accession in Turkey according to Cengiz and Hoffman (2013). They note that there 
was a change in policy after the credible commitment from the EU disappeared, but 
Mohapatra (2011) takes this one step further. He draws a connection between popular 
opinion and credible commitment. He correctly points out the huge fall in public opinion 
concerning EU accession after there was no longer a credible commitment,20 and 
contends that this forced the AKP to take on a more nationalistic tone. This view is also 
echoed by Captagy (2012). This line of reasoning leads to two conclusions. First, that a 
lack of credible commitment leads to a drop in public opinion and second that this drop 
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 53% between 2002 and 2007 (Mohapatra, 2011, pp. 158-159) 
14 
then allows the government to halt its steps to implement reforms that may bring the 
country closer to meeting all membership requirements.  
Domestic Politics 
Kurdish Constituency 
A disturbing development for the AKP has been the loss of Kurdish voters. As 
Noel and Bahceli (2010) point out there has always been a strong Kurdish presence 
within Islamist parties in Turkey and within the AKP specifically. This trend began to 
change though, and both Cengiz and Hoffman (2013) and Ozkirimli (2013) demonstrate 
that Kurds have been switching their votes to regional or ethnically based parties. In 
2009, the Turkish government began the “Kurdish Opening” in an attempt to reconcile   
with the PKK. Although their reasons for doing so were not entirely security-based, 
according to  Cengiz and Hoffman (2013). They contend that in 2009 Erdogan’s goal 
was to sway Kurdish voters into the camp of the AKP. According to them Erdogan 
realized that the AKP was losing its traditional Kurdish constituency, and attempted to 
regain their votes by reconciling with the PKK. 
Data Analysis 
 There are a number of possible reasons for the reforms implemented by the 
Turkish government in September 2013; both supported and not supported by the 
literature written on previous periods of reforms. There is a consensus that a credible 
commitment from the European Union was the reason for the 2002-2003 reforms and 
that Erdogan’s desire to bolster his support amongst the Kurds was the main reason 
behind the “Kurdish Opening” in 2009. There are also a few claims that are 
unsupported by the literature that should be examined because they could have had an 
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effect. These include a desire for better relations with the autonomous Kurdish region in 
Iraq as well as a desire for peace and reconciliation with the PKK. 
Credible Commitment 
 Credible commitment can be a key component of successful periods of reform 
within Turkey, as acknowledged by many authors. As stated earlier, a credible 
commitment can be defined as a commitment from the European Union and her most 
influential member states, France and Germany, to Turkish accession. This commitment 
can be measured in a number of ways. First, whether or not accession negotiations 
were open at the time and how they were proceeding. Second, the statements and 
actions of the organizations and individuals that comprise the leadership of the 
European Union, and whether French and German leaders have made a commitment to 
full Turkish integration.  Finally, whether or not Turkish leaders and the Turkish people 
were committed to working with the European Union. 
 Accession Negotiations  
One method of determining whether there was a credible commitment from the 
European Union is to examine whether or not accession negotiations were open at the 
time. They were, in fact, not open and had been closed for over three years prior to the 
September of 2013 reforms (Today's Zaman, 2013). Many chapters were still also 
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closed at the time due to France and Cyprus blocking them and only one chapter was 
sure to be opened in the near future21.  
However, the decision to open these talks in October had been made in July in 
the midst of the contentious Gezi Park Protests22 (Uras, 2013). The fact that the 
European Union was willing to agree upon opening talks in July, in the midst of these 
protests and in spite of the criticism of member states (Mcelroy, 2013), shows the 
European Union’s commitment to Turkey complying more fully with European norms, 
though not demonstrating a clear commitment for Turkish membership.   
European Union 
 Another way to determine whether or not there was a credible commitment is to 
examine the statements and actions of the European Union’s leaders. The European 
Union was, at least nominally, committed to further integration of Turkey as shown by 
the following quote from the key findings page of the European Commission’s Progress 
Report for Turkey, “It is in the interest of both the EU and Turkey that accession 
negotiations regain their momentum, not least to ensure the EU remains the 
benchmarks for reforms in Turkey”  (European Commission, 2012). Captagay also 
agreed that the EU has remained committed to Turkish integration saying  
                                               
21
 The Chapter on Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments was set to be opened in November of 
2013 after being unblocked by France (The Council of the European Union, 2013). 
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 A series of protests held throughout Turkey held to protest the government of Prime Minister Erdogan. The 
Turkish government’s response to these protests was harsh and widely criticized (Uras, 2013).  
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The European Union’s recent progress report on Turkey’s membership harshly criticized Mr. 
Erdogan’s government. Yet, smartly, Europe has not pulled back, but moved closer. Leaders in 
Brussels are aware that Turkey will pivot further away if accession does not again become a 
reality. (Captagay, 2013) 
The European Union, even though it recognizes the difficulties evident in accession, has 
remained committed to driving reform in Turkey because it realizes how important the 
integration of Turkey is to the Union and how detrimental23 a pivot away from Europe on 
the part of Turkey could be for the Union.  
 France and Germany 
France and Germany, in contrast, were not committed to the integration of 
Turkey into the European Union. Both powers have made it clear that they favor a close 
partnership between Turkey and the European Union rather than the accession of 
Turkey into the Union (Chislett, 2013) (Brown, 2014). The French and Germans fear the 
accession of a nation as large as Turkey into the Union because of its political 
implications. European Union voting is calculated by population and as such Turkey 
would have a very large say in the affairs of the Union, slightly less than Germany and 
more than France if it were to join (Captagay, 2013). There has also been a lot of 
skepticism, from the German government in particular, about Turkey’s human rights 
record, especially in regards to its handling of the Gezi Park protests (Mcelroy, 2013). 
The statements and actions of the leaders of both governments show that they do 
support a closer association of Turkey with Europe. They also show that these same 
leaders do not support Turkish accession into the European Union, which is a requisite 
for the definition of credible commitment supplied earlier.  
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and a Turkish pivot away from Europe and towards the Middle East (Captagay, The New York Times, 2013). 
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Turkish Commitment 
After examining statements from Turkish officials and opinion polls within Turkey 
it seems unlikely that the European Union’s reaction played into the AKP’s decision-
making process. The Turkish government’s reaction to criticism from the EU over its 
handling of the Gezi Park protests is enlightening. The following is a quote from Turkish 
EU Minister Egemen Bagis, “The EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU...If  
we have to, we could tell them to get lost” (Dombey, Germany blocks Turkey’s bid to 
join EU, 2013). This makes absolutely clear that there are some areas in which Turkey 
will not compromise in order to conform to European standards. This also reflects 
Turkish public opinion in some ways. Only 44% of Turks are in favor of joining the 
European Union, down from 73% in 2004 and 34% say that joining the European Union 
would be bad for Turkey, up from 7% in 2004 (The German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, 2013). These sea changes in public opinion within Turkey make it unlikely that 
any sort of credible commitment will elicit a major response from the Turkish 
government on its own. 
Conclusions 
 The evidence points to the fact that there was not a credible commitment from 
the European Union at this time. There was a commitment to reform within Turkey from 
European leaders, and one of the accession chapters would be opened soon but many 
others remained closed. In addition, Germany and France had still not given credible 
commitments to Turkish accession, and continued to support a special partnership 
between the European Union and Turkey rather than full membership.  The reforms 
were announced on September 30th  (BBC, 2013) , about a month before accession 
negotiations were set to begin again. Although there was no announcement from the 
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Turkish government saying that this is one of their reasons for implementing the 
reforms; the timing and scope of the reforms makes it possible that the Turkish 
government could have pointed to them as an example of democracy, and liberal 
government working in Turkey. Especially after the criticism the Turkish government 
received in the wake of the Gezi Park protests (Mcelroy, 2013).  
It is very unlikely that the primary reason for implementing these reforms was a 
hope to join Europe. Turkey did not have a strong commitment from the European 
Union and had already shown its unwillingness to adhere to European standards in 
certain circumstances with its actions during the Gezi Park protests. Turkish leaders 
also had latitude to not pursue European integration because of the historically small 
number of Turks (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013) pushing for 
membership in the Union because there was no credible commitment.  
Domestic Political Considerations 
Another reason for the implementation of the 2013 reforms could have been due 
to domestic political considerations. These considerations could include a cessation of 
violence or reconciliation with the PKK, a desire to decrease support for the PKK and 
increase support for moderate Kurdish groups and the AKP.  
Reconciliation with PKK 
The reforms were widely seen as an attempt to facilitate the peace process with 
the PKK (Jonathan Burch, 2013) and the surrounding events support this view. On 
September 9th the PKK reversed its decision to withdraw its fighters from Turkey. The 
agreement between the PKK and the Turkish government was contingent upon a series 
of reforms being introduced by the 1st of September. The Turkish government failed to 
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introduce said reforms which caused the PKK to halt their withdrawal.  (Tastekin, 2013). 
This may have led the Turkish leadership, in fear of the return of violence to Turkey, to 
rush through the package of reforms that was introduced on the 30th of September. One 
of the AKP’s key policy goals throughout their tenure in Turkey has been 
democratization and peace in Turkey, and a failure to maintain their progress could 
have led to a large loss in support at the polls. This method also seems to have met 
with some success. In recent months, as the divide between Erdogan and Gulen has 
widened24, the PKK has publicly voiced its support for the AKP party and Erdogan in the 
dispute (Akyol, 2014).  
Support for the AKP 
 Another possible reason for the implementation of reforms is that the AKP hoped 
to increase support for itself in Kurdish regions. The Kurds in the past have proven to be 
a key constituency for the AKP party because of their conservative leanings. According 
to a study done by the ORG Center, support for the AKP was also dropping at this time 
amongst Kurds in favor of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) (Kurd Press, 2013). 
One of the key results of the previously mentioned study was that if peace talks were to 
be successful between the AKP and the PKK, then support for the BDP would most 
likely increase. This makes it unlikely that Erdogan expected a rise in support for the 
AKP, particularly in light of the fact that the 2013 reforms lowered the thresholds for 
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 Fetullah Gulen is the leader of a large movement called Hizmet in Turkey which has been responsible for a series 
of corruption investigations and leaks targeting the AKP regime (Dombey, Gulen calls for new constitution in 
Turkey, 2014). 
21 
party entrance into parliament and campaign funding25  (BBC, 2013).  
 
Kurdish-Liberal-Conservative Alliance 
One possibility for the unveiling of these reforms is that Erdogan sought to 
recreate a Conservative-Liberal-Kurdish Alliance in Turkey (Kemal, 2013). Such an 
alliance was essential to the AKP party’s success in developing Turkey’s economy after 
the AKP came to power. The formation of such an alliance seems unlikely to have 
influenced the AKP’s decision making process for three reasons. First, the large-scale 
protests held in Gezi Park were mainly driven by liberal secularists and those opposed 
to liberal economic policies (BBC, 2013) (Azizleri, 2013) who would be unlikely to work 
with the AKP in a coalition after its handling of the unrest. Second, the new reforms did 
nothing to assuage the fears of liberal secularists and were likely to inflame tensions 
between conservatives and secularists because of the lifting of the ban on 
headscarves26. Third, the AKP has taken an ever more conservative and Islamist 
approach in recent years. With the removal of the threat of a military coup27, they have 
complete freedom to act as long as they are able to maintain their popular mandate and 
a majority in parliament.  
Conservative Alliance 
A more likely possibility is that Erdogan sought to create a new conservative 
alliance with the BDP. Though the BDP is considered by some a political arm of the 
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 Both are changes that could make it possible for the BDP to compete with the AKP on the national stage.  
26
 Lifting this ban has been one of the long-term goals of both Erdogan and Islamists within Turkey and has been 
an extremely contentious issue between secularists and Islamists (BBC, 2013). 
27
 Erdogan successfully imprisoned a number of officers accused of plotting against his government in “Operation 
Sledgehammer” (BBC, 2013) 
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PKK (Idiz, 2013), both groups have given up any stated desire for the independence of 
the Kurdish regions in Turkey. Rather these groups now only seek increased autonomy. 
These are goals that the AKP is able to work with and they have shown their 
commitment to the democratization of eastern Turkey and limited autonomy for the 
Kurdish people through the reforms which have been implemented. The two parties also 
have common ground to stand on ideologically because of their constituencies’ 
commitment to (the Turkish version of) Islamic values. The Kurds are, for the most part, 
conservative and committed to Islamic values, just as the supporters of the AKP party 
are, (Bahceli & Noel, 2010) and it seems increasingly likely that a conservative alliance 
composed of the BDP and the AKP will emerge. There is another compelling argument 
in favor of this being the AKP’s goal. As stated earlier, the AKP’s support in Kurdish 
regions was falling at this time28. If Erdogan’s goal was only to increase support for the 
AKP, he would have introduced only the reforms dealing with linguistic and educational 
reforms. Instead, he also introduced electoral reforms which make it much easier for a 
Kurdish party to obtain money for and to compete in a national election campaign. 
Erdogan would not have given the BDP the tools to outcompete him in the East, unless 
he believed that a partnership between the two was both possible and politically 
advantageous.  
Subsequent Evidence 
 There are also two pieces of evidence that occurred after the reforms were 
implemented that seem to show that Erdogan hoped to create this alliance. The first is 
his ongoing battle with the Gulen movement while the second is his attempts to forge a 
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 This is also supported by Cengiz and Hoffman (2013) and Ozkirimli (2013) 
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closer relationship with the Kurds, and in particular the events he organized in 
Diraybakir. 
Gulen and the Hizmet Movement 
 There are also a number of events that occurred after the reforms package was 
introduced that made this conservative alliance between the AKP and Kurdish parties 
more likely. Shortly after these reforms were implemented, in November of 2013, 
Erdogan announced plans to shut down private preparation schools in Turkey. This was 
a move widely speculated to be targeted against Fetullah Gulen, the leader of the 
Hizmet movement within Turkey (The Economist, 2013). Gulen was up until this time a 
staunch supporter of the AKP but with this move became one of its greatest enemies 
using the so-called parallel state29 to investigate many close to the AKP for corruption 
(Uras, Turkish probe marks AKP-Gulen power struggle, 2013) and releasing evidence 
that seemed to implicate even Erdogan in corruption (Financial Times, 2014).  
In examining Erdogan’s decision it is necessary to realize just how pervasive the 
parallel state was (and may still be) within Turkey. Many members of the judiciary and 
security services were members of the Hizmet movement (Coskun, 2014) and Erdogan 
may have felt threatened by their influence. The Kurds on the other hand may not have 
seemed as threatening and were still conservative and thus a natural ally for Erdogan. It 
is likely that Erdogan saw them as a partner that would be easier to control. The Hizmet 
movement was also opposed to expanded Kurdish autonomy or any sort of negotiated 
peace with the PKK (Wilgenburg, 2013) (Akyol, Is Gulen Movement Against Peace With 
                                               
29 A number of government officials are followers of the HIzmet movement and supposedly take orders from 
Gulen. These officials as a whole are called the parallel state (Coskun, 2014).  
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PKK?, 2013). It is even speculated that the split began over a disagreement over how to 
approach the peace process in 2012 when a Hizmet official investigated a special 
negotiator sent to speak with the PKK in secret by Erdogan (Yildiz, 2014). This may 
have made Erdogan’s decision to split with the movement easier because he realized 
that he would be supported by many Kurds if he did so.  
“The Diyarbakir Encounter” 
 Erdogan’s actions after the reforms were implemented also show his 
commitment to Kurds within Turkey and a possible new alliance with the Kurds. On 
November 16th of 2013 the Turkish government organized an event to be held in 
Diyarbakir which is the most important city in Turkish Kurdistan. The event was 
designed to bring together Turks and Kurds. It was sent out across all of Turkey on 
public television channels and gave many Turks a glimpse into Kurdish customs as a 
number of cultural events were broadcast over the course of the event. Another 
signature event was when a famous Kurdish musician who had been exiled arrived and 
performed with a famous Turkish artist for all in Turkey to see. Political leaders also 
contributed to the event with Barzani calling for Turkish and Kurdish brothers to band 
together while Erdogan used the word Kurdistan, which is the first time a Turkish 
President or Prime Minister has used that name for the region in public. Another notable 
action of Erdogan’s was to meet with representatives of the BDP party which currently 
controls the local administration of Diyarbakir (Çandar, 2013) and will likely be able to 
compete nationally once Erdogan’s electoral reforms are fully implemented.   
 Conclusions 
 After examining all of the information available, it seems likely that domestic 
political considerations did have a significant degree of influence on the AKP’s decision 
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to introduce the 2013 reforms. It is likely that after the Gezi Park protests Erdogan 
realized that courting the liberal-secularists in Turkey would be fruitless, causing him to 
launch a campaign to create a new conservative alliance. Realizing that they were 
losing support in Kurdish areas, the AKP decided to introduce laws that would allow 
Kurdish parties to run on the national level while at the same time cementing 
themselves as a conservative party opposed to the liberals with the passage of 
thesection lifting the ban on headscarves. The AKP also realized that they needed to 
pass a package of reforms soon, or risk renewed conflict in the East in addition to the 
civil unrest already going on in many of Turkey’s large cities. It seems likely that this 
was a calculated political move by Erdogan to ensure his own base stayed with the AKP 
by lifting the ban on headscarves and placating the PKK while at the same time inviting 
a renewed BDP to join him on the national stage in a conservative alliance. Erdogan’s 
actions after the reforms were implemented also show where his intentions may have 
lay. His moves in November to both attack the Hizmet movement and forge a closer 
relationship with the Kurds show his commitment to a prospective conservative alliance 
between the AKP and the Kurds.  
Relations with Iraqi Kurdistan 
Relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have been improving immensely 
as the region has gained greater autonomy from the central government of Iraq and 
asserted its control over energy resources in the North of Iraq. A strategic partnership 
between the two would prove extremely beneficial for both as it diversifies Turkey’s 
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energy market and allows it to partly fulfill its goal of becoming an energy corridor. At 
the same time it allows the Kurds in Northern Iraq to sell their energy resources without 
the need to involve Iraq’s federal government (Tol, 2013). It is beneficial to both sides to 
build a closer relationship, but the questions that need to be answered are whether or 
not this move would actually help Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan and whether 
relations need to be improved in order to fulfill Turkey’s geopolitical goals.  
This move would undoubtedly buoy Turkish relations with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) because it will give Kurds within Turkey more freedoms while 
simultaneously weakening the PKK as Kurds realize they can achieve their goals in the 
political arena without raising arms. The KRG) have often been at odds with one 
another (Natali, 2013) and Barzani30 will undoubtedly approve of any move that 
weakens PKK influence. 
Though it would increase relations between the KRG and the Turkish 
government, it is unlikely that the reforms were introduced in order to do so. Relations 
were already at a point where such a move was unnecessary. The KRG was supporting 
Turkey against the PKK, (Today's Zaman, 2012) (Rafoglu, 2012) and had already 
signed energy deals to start shipping resources to Turkey beginning in early 2014 (Tol, 
2013). With both of these points in mind it is unlikely that Erdogan would have 
introduced these reforms solely to foster better relations, though it is a favorable 
consequence of doing so.   
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Conclusion 
 This thesis examined the reasons behind the introduction of the September 2013 
package reforms by the AKP. In order to do so it compiled research dealing with two 
prior periods of reform, one in 2002-2003 and the other in 2009. The research showed 
that the first period of reform was due to a credible commitment from the European 
Union to Turkey’s accession while the second period was the result of domestic political 
factors. After examining the events surrounding the 2013 reforms, three possible 
reasons were found: a credible commitment from the European Union, domestic 
political factors, and a desire to forge a closer relationship between Turkey and Iraqi 
Kurdistan. There was not a credible commitment at the time because Germany and 
France were both opposed to the accession of Turkey to the European Union. The AKP 
had also showed its unwillingness to curtail itself in order to comply with European 
norms and, in addition did not have to fight against a wave of popular support for 
integration in order to do so. It also seemed unlikely that forging a closer relationship 
with Iraqi Kurdistan was a major reason for the implementation of reforms because 
relations between Turkey and the aforementioned government were already good. 
Therefore the most plausible reason for the introduction of these reforms was that 
Erdogan hoped to form a new conservative alliance between the AKP and Kurdish 
parties. This is validated by electoral reforms he passed allowing Kurdish parties to 
compete on the national stage, his subsequent moves against the Hizmet movement 
and his facilitation of the “Diyarbakir Encounter” which showed his commitment to a 
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